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Abstract 
Recent political events in the United States have created a political climate that promotes prejudice against Mid-
dle Eastern, Iranian, and Muslim people. In this study, we were interested in investigating two questions: (1) How 
welcome do Iranian-American men and women from various religious backgrounds (Muslim, Jewish, or no religious 
affiliation) feel in their new homeland (specifically, how much social distance (affective distance) do they think their 
Euro-American neighbors feel toward them? and (2) to what extent does the possession of stereotypical Middle East-
ern, Iranian, or Muslim traits (an accent, darker skin, wearing of religious symbols, traditional garb, etc.) spark prejudice 
and thus Iranian-Americans perception of social distance? Participants were recruited from two very different sources: 
(1) shoppers at grocery stores in Iranian-American neighborhoods in Los Angeles, and (2) a survey posted on http://
Surveymonkey.com. A total of 374 Iranian-Americans, ages 18 and older, completed an in-person or online ques-
tionnaire that included the following: a request for demographic information, religious preferences, a survey of how 
typically Iranian-American the respondents’ traits were, and the social distance scale. A surprise was that it was the 
Iranian-American Jews (not the Muslims), who felt most keenly that Euro-Americans kept them at a distance. Jewish 
women received higher scores on the social distance scale than did members of any other group. In addition, again, it 
was mainly Iranian-American Jews, particularly those who spoke with a Middle Eastern accent or wore stereotypically 
religious symbols, who felt the most social distance existing between them and “typical” Americans.
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Background
At one time, the USA and Iran had fairly cordial rela-
tions. When Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi was the 
Shah from 1941 until his overthrow (in 1979), the 
USA was a strong supporter of Iran and the Shah. In 
1979, the Iranian Revolution occurred, and the Ayatol-
lah Khomeini seized power. He was named Supreme 
Leader, the country was renamed the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, and the Iranian legal system was replaced by a 
set of Islamic laws and regulations. American-Iranian 
relations began to deteriorate. In 1979, the Iran Hos-
tage Crisis occurred; 63 American diplomats and 
citizens were held prisoner in Tehran for 444  days. 
Starting in 1982, the USA began secretly assisting 
Saddam Hussein in the Iranian/Iraq war, supplying Iraq 
with billions of dollars in economic aid, military intel-
ligence, and weapons. In 1988, Iranian Air Flight 655, 
an Iranian civilian passenger plane making a routine 
run from Tehran to Dubai, was shot down by the US 
missile Cruiser USS Vincennes in the Persian Gulf. On 
November 11, 2001, when al Qaeda supporters flew 
planes into the World Trade Center and the Penta-
gon in Washington, D. C., Iranian-American relations 
plummeted. In 2002, President George W. Bush desig-
nated Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as the “Axis of Evil” 
and named Iran as a terrorist state. In recent months 
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(in 2015), President Obama’s attempts to negotiate an 
anti-nuclear agreement with Iran has reignited anti-
Iranian passions.
“Anti-Iranian sentiment” refers to feelings and expres-
sion of hostility, hatred, prejudice directed toward Iran 
and its culture and toward men and women of Iranian 
descent. In this paper, we will define prejudice as “think-
ing ill of others without sufficient warrant” (Allport 1954, 
p. 6). “Discrimination comes about only when we deny 
to individuals or groups of people equality of treatment 
which they may wish” (Allport 1954, p. 51).
Today, condemnations of Iran and Iranian-Americans 
are fairly common. Conservative commentator Ann 
Coulter referred to Iranians as “ragheads” (Gossett 2008). 
Brent Scowcroft, a one-time National Security Agency 
advisor, called the Iranian people “rug merchants” (New 
York Times 2007). The Columbus Dispatch recently ran 
a cartoon portraying Iran as a sewer with cockroaches 
crawling out of it (NIAC 2007). Debra Cagan, a senior 
official at The Pentagon, declared: “I hate all Iranians” 
(Wikipedia 2015a, b). In March, 2015, Bolton (20l5), one 
time US ambassador to the United Nations, in a New 
York Times op-ed piece, advised, “To Stop Iran’s Bomb, 
Bomb Iran” (For a comprehensive review of the history 
of American-Iranian relations and anti-Iranian-Ameri-
can prejudice and discrimination, see Harris 2012; Paige 
2014).
When two nations are at odds, resentments tend to 
spill over into the dialog back home. American citizens 
begin to resent those whose ethnic background is differ-
ent from their own. The process by which people begin 
to hate others has been described as the “mirror image” 
effect (White 1970). Namely, when two countries, such as 
Iran and the USA, have contentious relations, the Ameri-
can majority will tend to label Iran and its Iranian-Amer-
ican citizens as bad and wrong and to justify their own 
country and people as good and right (Peteraf and Shan-
ley 1997; White 1970). In the wake of the 1979 Iran Hos-
tage Crisis, for example, 70  % of American participants 
reported a positive image of Americans (considering 
them as friendly and safe), and a negative image of Irani-
ans (e.g., unfriendly and dangerous; Johnston et al. 1980).
People also typically report less favorable attitudes 
toward members of countries that are culturally dis-
similar than those that are similar to themselves (Nincic 
and Russett 1979; Rouhana and Fiske 1995). Important 
cultural dimensions upon which Iran and Iranian-
Americans differ from the USA are political character-
istics, religion, and language. The increased likelihood of 
favorable attitudes toward those who are culturally simi-
lar is due to categorization of individuals as belonging 
to the in-group (or possessing a closer relation to the in-
group) versus the out-group. The in-group is comprised 
of the cultural, ethnic, and social groups one feels a part 
of; the out-group is comprised of social groups one com-
petes with and does not associate with (Tajfel and Turner 
1979).
Categorizing people as part of the in-group versus out-
group has significant psychological implications. Differ-
ences between the in-group and out-group are described 
as the social–cognitive perception of differences between 
“we and they” (McLauchlin and Pearlman 2011; Tajfel 
and Turner 1979; Yamagishi et al. 2008). People sympa-
thize and feel similar to members of their in-group and 
dislike and compete with members of the out-group 
(Tajfel and Turner 1979; Waldzus et  al. 2004). The out-
group categorization of individuals leads to “a negative 
evaluation of a social group, or a negative evaluation of 
a person that is significantly based on the individual’s 
group memberships” (Crandall and Eshleman 2003, p. 
414), in order to maintain a degree of cognitive consist-
ency (Bronfenbrenner 1961; Nail et al. 2003).
The news for Iranian-Americans, however, is not 
all bad. Many people, such as President Obama, have 
praised Iranian-Americans for their patriotism, success 
in the United States, and hard work. Advocates point 
out that the United States has been welcoming to Iranian 
immigrants, and that prominent Iranian-Americans can 
be found among the ranks of diplomats, scientists, educa-
tors (Robert Mehrabian, President of Carnegie Mellon), 
business (Arash Ferdowsi, CEO of Dropbox; Alex Mehr 
and Shajan Zedeh, founders of Zoosk), filmmakers (Bob 
Yari, Academy Award winning film producer), NBA play-
ers (Hamed Haddadi, center for Phoenix Sons), actors, 
comedians, and authors (e.g., Dumas, author of the 2003 
book Funny in Farsi: A Memoir of Growing up Iranian in 
America, which sold over 100,000 copies).
Perceptions of Iranian‑American men and women
Iranian-Americans are a diverse group. Although many 
identify with the Shi’a, Sunni, and Sufi branches of Islam, 
others consider themselves to be Bahá’í, Christians, Jews, 
Mandeans, Yarsanis, or Zoroastrians. Some are atheists. 
Iranian-Americans also vary greatly in education, occu-
pation, and income. In fact, although Iranian-Americans’ 
yearly income, education, and occupation exceed the 
US national average, income varies too. In spite of that 
diversity, many Americans stereotype Iranian-Amer-
icans. Eagly and Kite (1987), for example, surveyed 303 
students at Purdue University. The undergraduate stu-
dents were asked to rate individuals from 28 countries. 
Participants stereotyped Middle-Eastern and Iranian-
American men and women as religious, traditional, and 
poor. Iranian-American men were stereotyped as hostile, 
aggressive, never giving up, dirty, proud, and arrogant; 
Iranian-American women were stereotyped as family 
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oriented, conforming, conservative, proud, devoted to 
others, honest, and emotional. More recently, Ghavami 
and Peplau (2013) surveyed 627 undergraduates from 
a Southern California University. They found that Mid-
dle Eastern men and women were stereotyped as Mus-
lim, dark-skinned, and religious. Middle Eastern men 
were stereotyped as anti-west, suspicious, and good at 
bargaining. Middle Eastern women were stereotyped as 
quiet, covered, oppressed, family-oriented, having many 
children, sexually conservative, and (being) housewives.
Consequently, as a result of experiencing public disap-
proval, Middle Easterners and Muslims in the USA are 
at risk of suffering alienation, isolation, depression, and 
anxiety (Britto 2008; Clay 2011), and post-traumatic 
stress disorder (Clay 2011). Middle Easterners experience 
hate crimes (Human Rights Watch 2002), racial profil-
ing (Siggins 2002), negativity during job interviews (King 
and Ahmad 2010), prejudice and discrimination within 
academia (Omeish 1999), and confront personal identity 
issues (Bradford 2009; Zaman 2010).
Such prejudiced attitudes sometimes spill over into 
hate crimes directed against Middle Easterners and any-
one who is assumed to be Middle Eastern or Muslim 
(Britto 2008). According to the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation reports (Human Rights Watch 2002), anti-Middle 
Eastern hate crimes increased 17-fold from the year 2000 
to 2001 (as cited in Human Rights Watch 2002).
Differences among Iranian‑Americans in perceptions 
of how accepting and rejecting the “Typical” American is 
towards them
Most past research has focused on either ethnicity or 
religion. However, it is the intersection of ethnicity (Mid-
dle Eastern/Iranian) and religion (Muslim), that sparks 
the biggest spike in prejudice and discrimination (Human 
Rights Watch 2002).
Not surprisingly, as prototype theory would have it 
(Allport 1954; Inman and Baronn 1996; Schneider 2005), 
people who are most easily identified as members of 
stigmatized groups are generally most vulnerable to vic-
timization. Members of the Middle Eastern community 
who hold occupations that are more typical for Mid-
dle Easterners are often especially likely to be victims of 
hate crimes (Human Rights Watch 2002). For example, 
taxi drivers, convenience store owners, and motel own-
ers were more likely to experience hate crimes than were 
those Middle Easterners who do not occupy typical occu-
pations for their ethnic group.
Other signs of group membership (and the ones 
in which we are interested here) are a Middle East-
ern accent, skin color, the wearing of obvious religious 
symbols, and dress. Dress includes a hijab for women 
and a turban for men in the Middle Eastern or Muslim 
communities. The hijab is a traditional Muslim article of 
clothing worn by women in the community to cover their 
hair. The turban is a traditional Middle Eastern (also Afri-
can and Far Eastern) headwear worn by men of the com-
munity, who may belong to a number of religious groups.
How do “Typical” Americans’ attitudes impact 
Iranian‑American men and women?
Thus far we have focused on the attitudes of “typical” 
American. Our next question (and the focus of this study) 
is “How do typical Americans’ prejudice and discrimina-
tion against Iranian-American Muslims affect that target 
group?” One scale often used to describe how willing 
people are to engage in social contacts with other social 
groups (such as racial and ethnic groups), is the Bogar-
dus (1959) social distance scale. Bogardus asks the extent 
to which people in various groups would be accepting of 
other groups (a score of 1.00 = the groups feel no social 
distance from one another). Groups ask to what extent 
they approve of the following types of intimacy with a 
given group. Would they admit them to:
  • As close relatives by marriage (i.e., as the legal spouse 
of a close relative).
  • As my close personal friends.
  • As neighbors on the same street.
  • As co-workers in the same occupation.
  • As citizens in my country.
  • As non-citizen visitors in my country.
  • Would exclude from entry into my country.
The Bogardus social distance scale is a cumulative scale 
(a Guttman scale), because agreement with an earlier 
item (say, would accept in marriage) implies agreement 
with the following items (i.e., would, say, admit as citizens 
to the country).
On the basis of the above theorizing, we proposed a 
series of hypotheses and questions:
Hypotheses
We assume that all Middle-Easterners, be they religious 
or non-religious, male or female, easily identifiable or 
noticeable only to the few, might expect to encounter 
some prejudice. In our study, we planned to explore the 
factors that make men and women especially susceptible 
to feeling welcome/unwelcome in their adopted home-
land. Specifically:
Hypothesis I Gender and religious affiliation (Mus-
lim, Jewish, or no religious affiliation) will affect Iranian-
Americans’ perceptions as to how willing Euro-Ameri-
cans are to welcome them. Specifically, Iranian-American 
Muslims will secure higher scores on the Social Distance 
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Scale than will their non-Muslim peers (be they Jewish 
or those possessing no religious affiliation). Muslim men 
will score higher on the Social Distance Scale than will 
Muslim women.
Hypothesis II Iranian-American Muslims who pos-
sess a strong Iranian accent, darker skin color, or who 
appear prototypically Muslim, engage in displays of reli-
gious affiliation or wear ethnically traditional clothing 
will secure higher scores on the Social Distance Scale 
than will Iranian-American Muslims whose appearance 
is more prototypically Euro-American. We will also con-
sider generational status, identification with an ethnic-
ity in addition to Iranian-American, family income, and 
education (as other possible markers of assimilation). 
We plan to test Hypothesis II by exploring two separate 
questions:
Question 1 Are Iranian-Americans’ perceptions of 
Euro-Americans’ social distance within the full sample 
predicted by Muslim identity, Jewish identity, gender, 
Iranian accent, skin color, displays of religious affiliation, 
displays of ethnically traditional clothing, generational 
status, identification with an ethnicity in addition to Ira-
nian-American, family income, and education?
Question 2 Are Iranian-Americans’ perceptions of 
Euro-Americans’ social distance within each religious 
subsample (Iranian-Americans: Muslim, Jewish, no reli-
gious affiliation), predicted by gender, Iranian accent, 
skin color, displays of religious affiliation, displays of eth-
nically traditional clothing, generational status, identifi-
cation with an ethnicity in addition to Iranian-American, 
family income, and education?




This study was described to potential participants as fol-
lows: “A Ph.D. student in the Department of Psychology 
at the University of Hawai’i, Mānoa is conducting a study 
on the social attitudes of Iranian-Americans. We are 
interested in perceptions of Iranian-Americans as to the 
extent to which prejudice and/or discrimination against 
Iranian-Americans exists in the USA You are being asked 
to participate because you are an adult over the age of 18 
who identifies as Iranian-American”.
Participants consisted of 341 Iranian-Americans [111 
men (33 %) and 230 (67 %) women], ranging in age from 
18 to 68 [M = 38, SD = 11.67]. A full 44 % identified as 
Muslim, 24 % identified as Jewish, 31 % reported having 
no religious affiliation, and the rest were Christian, other, 
or did not report their religion. Education varied as fol-
lows: grade school (2 %), high school (12 %), vocational 
degree or certification (4  %), BA/BS (34  %), MS/MA 
(24 %), or Ph.D./MD (15 %). A few failed to indicate their 
educational level (9  %). When asked what their annual 
household income was during childhood, participants 
indicted the following: Under $17,000 (4  %), $17,000–
$24,999 (5 %), $25,000–$49,999 (13 %), $50,000–$99,999 
(37 %), and $100,000 + (29 %), with 13 % choosing not to 
report.
Forty-two percent of participants were interviewed 
face-to-face and 58 % were recruited online. The in-per-
son participants were approached at two ethnically Per-
sian (Iranian) grocery stores, Jordan Market and Super 
Sun, on Westwood Boulevard in West Los Angeles. The 
first author, who speaks Farsi, conducted all of these 
interviews.
Iranian-American participants who completed an 
online survey were recruited in a variety of ways. We col-
laborated with the Persian American Society for Health 
Advancement (PASHA—a non-religious organization 
which includes Jewish, Muslim, and Iranian-Americans 
with various religious affiliations). We also contacted 
the following Iranian-American organizations and asked 
them to distribute information about the survey. These 
were: University of Maryland Iranian Student Founda-
tion, Persian American Association of Northern Cali-
fornia, Iranian-American Women’s Foundation, Persian 
Student Association at Stanford University, Iranian Stu-
dent Alliance in America at UC Berkeley, Association 
of Professors and Scholars of Iranian Heritage, Iranian 
Students Association at Arizona State University, Pars 
Times, Iranian-American Cultural Association of Mis-
souri, Iranian-American Bar Association, Persian Aca-
demic and Cultural Student Association at the University 
of Southern California, and The Persian American Soci-
ety for Health Advancement. We also sent invitations to 
synagogues. The following synagogues were contacted: 
Chabad of Bel Air, Beth Jacob Congregation, Congrega-
tion Magen David of Beverly Hills, Young Israel of North 
Beverly Hills, LeoBaeck Temple, and University Syna-
gogue. The aforementioned synagogues were emailed 
because they were located in or around the Beverly Hills 
area. According to Montagne (2006) of National Public 
Radio, 20 % of individuals living in Beverly Hills are Ira-
nian-American and 40 % of students who attend schools 
in the area are Iranian-American. Alas, most did not 
reply. Finally, we contacted individuals with ethnically 
Iranian names and invited them to complete the survey 
via http://LinkedIn.com. Surveys were conducted on and 
http://SurveyMonkey.com and were available via http://
Facebook.com and http://LinkedIn.com.
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Demographics
Ethnic background Our first step was to ensure that all 
participants were Iranian-American. All were. In order 
to gain a fuller picture of participants’ backgrounds, we 
asked a few supplementary questions. These included: 
“Do you identify with any other ethnic group besides 
Iranian-American? (e.g., Azerbaijani, Afghani, Bahrani, 
etc.)?” About half of participants identified with an addi-
tional sub-ethnic group (say, for example, Turkish-Ira-
nian). Participants’ generational status was also assessed. 
We asked, “How many generations has your family been 
in the USA?” The majority (83  %) was born outside the 
US and 18 % were born in the USA.
Religious affiliation Participants were asked, “What is 
your religious affiliation? Please write none if you have no 
religious affiliation.” Of the participants who were willing 
to disclose their religion, 44 % identified as Muslim, 24 % 
identified as Jewish, 31  % reported having no religious 
affiliation, and 1 % indicted other.
Independent variables
We asked a series of questions in order to ascertain how 
“typically” (i.e., stereotypically) Middle Eastern, Iranian-
American, or Muslim participants would appear to be 
from their accent, skin tone, or appearance. We included 
the following questions:
Accent. Participants were asked, “Do you consider 
yourself to have an Iranian accent when speaking Eng-
lish?” Possible responses ranged from 1 = not at all to 7 
= acute. A full 32 % checked “Not at all”, 13 % indicated 
between “Not at all” and “mild”, 15 % reported “mild”, 5 % 
reported an accent between “mild” and “moderate”, 17 % 
reported “moderate”, 12 % reported between “moderate” 
and “acute”, 6  % reported having an “acute” accent. The 
higher the score, the stronger the Iranian the accent is.
Skin tone Participants were asked to match their own 
skin tone to exemplars on The Fitzpatrick Scale, a color 
chart depicting various skin types (Daniel et  al. 2009). 
Possible hues ranged from Type 1 (Red and blonde hair, 
blue eyes, burns easily, never tans, freckles, very fair skin) 
to Type 6 (Black hair, dark brown eyes. May never burn). 
The majority of participants (61 %) rated their skin tone 
as a 4 on the Fitzpatrick Scale (i.e., as possessing “dark 
brown hair and green, hazel, or brown eyes. Slow to burn, 
tans easily”). The higher the score, the darker the partici-
pant’s skin tone is.
Symbols of religious affiliation Participants were asked, 
“Do you wear symbols of your religious affiliation? (e.g., 
Cross, Yarmulke, Turban, Scarf, etc.).” Possible answers 
ranged from 0 = no to 1 = yes (i.e., sometimes or always). 
Most participants reported “never” displaying religious 
symbols (71 %), others reported “sometimes” or “always” 
displaying such symbols (29  %). In coding, possible 
answers ranged from 0 = no to 1 = yes.
Next, participants who wore such symbols were asked: 
“If so, what do you wear?” The majority reported wear-
ing a scarf/hijab (15 %), displaying the Star of David (3 %), 
a yarmulke (2  %), a faravahar (symbol of Zoroastrian-
ism) (1 %), an Allah necklace (1 %), or religious jewelry 
(5 %). Less than 2 % of participants reported displaying: a 
Kara (steel bangle worn by Sikhs) (0.3 %), evil eye jewelry 
(0.3 %), a cross (0.3 %), a beard (0.3 %), an Islamic Stone 
(0.3 %), or tasbih prayer beads (0.5 %).
Ethnically traditional clothing Participants were asked, 
“Do you wear ethnically traditional clothing? (e.g., cloth-
ing worn in non-urban areas of Iran, such as Mahali 
clothing)?” The majority (94 %) of participants reported 
“never” wearing such clothing. A small percentage of 
participants (5  %) reported “sometimes” wearing such 
clothing. No participant reported “always” wearing such 
clothing. Scores ranged from 0 = no to 1 = yes.
Those who wore such clothing were asked when they 
wore such clothing. Answers were assigned to the fol-
lowing categories: seldom (2  %), on Halloween (1  %), 
ethnic/cultural events (2 %), once a month (1 %), or very 
often (1  %). When asked what kind of ethnic clothing 
they wore, they indicated the following: thobe/dishdasha 
(0.3 %), mahali dress (1.1 %), colorful scarf (0.8 %), scarfs/
jewelry (0.3 %), or bags/scarves/jewelry/skirt (1.6 %).
Occupation Participants were asked: “What is your 
occupation? We then converted specific occupations to 
more general categories. Answers (after our conversion) 
were: white collar (84  %), blue collar (1  %), homemaker 
(10  %), or other (5  %). In order to gain a better under-
standing of participants’ backgrounds, we asked two 
additional questions: “What was your father’s occupa-
tion?” Again, following the same procedure, specific 
responses were placed in the following categories: White 
collar (75  %), blue collar (3  %), Army (8  %), or other 
(14  %). “What was your mother’s occupation?” Again, 
participants’ responses were placed in the following cate-
gories: White collar (36 %), blue collar (0 %), homemaker 
(35 %), or other (29 %).
Geographic location Participants were asked to indicate 
their geographic location. Participants came from the fol-
lowing areas: Los Angeles, CA (28  %), Orange County, 
CA (28  %), California (30  %), Orange County or Los 
Angeles (1 %), or other (13 %).
Dependent variable
The Social Distance Scale (Bogardus 1959) is designed to 
assess Iranian-Americans’ perceptions as to the extent 
that Euro-Americans accept them. Our slight revision of 
the scale asked Iranian-Americans how accepting they 
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think Euro-Americans are of Iranian-Americans. Pos-
sibilities range from: “Do you believe Euro-Americans 
would marry into the Iranian-American group?… like 
them as close friends?… Like them as next door neigh-
bors?” And so forth. (see Table  1 for a description of 
the scale used in this study). Participants were asked to 
answer each question with either a yes or no. Questions 
1–4 were coded as no =  1 and yes =  0. Questions 5–7 
were coded as no  =  0 and yes  =  1. Possible (original) 
scores ranged from 0 to 7. Replies were averaged; aver-
aged scores ranged from 0 to 1. The higher the number, 
the more convinced Iranian-Americans were that Euro-
Americans would reject them—i.e., that Euro-Americans 
would wish to maintain a greater social distance. Cron-
bach’s α level for the Social Distance Scale was α = 0.82 
(Angermeyer et al. 2003).
Since its introduction in 1925, Bogardus’s scale has 
been subject to serious challenges, especially when used 
outside the Western cultural context. Weinfurt and 
Moghaddam (2001), for example, report that Indian 
and Algerian respondents deviated substantially from 
the assumption of ordinal scales of the questionnaire. 
Although results need to be interpreted with caution, 
scholars such as Klicperová-Baker and Kost’ál (2011) 
have concluded, on the basis of an extensive review of the 
SDS literature:
Over the years, social distance proved to be a viable 
concept and the SDS method is still both a favorite 
tool and an inspiration for constructing related 
social distance techniques (p. 3).
Thus we chose to use a slight variation of this tradi-
tional scale, which seemed appropriate for our Iranian-
American population (see Table 1).
Procedure
We recruited face-to-face participants from grocery 
stores 2 weeks prior to Persian New Year because many 
Iranian-Americans shop for groceries right before 
the holidays. Dr. Paige approached participants by 
introducing herself in Farsi. She then translated questions 
into Farsi or English, as the respondents preferred. The 
survey was completed with paper and pen. Participants 
who were recruited online were provided with a link to 
Surveymonkey.com.
The surveys included a consent form and the follow-
ing scales: (1) a demographic questionnaire (which asked 
about respondents’ gender, age, ethnic background, and 
religion). They were also asked about the possession of 
a foreign accent, generational status, skin tone/color, 
displays of religiously symbolic clothing, displays of eth-
nically traditional clothing, highest level of education, 
family income during childhood, occupation, father’s 
occupation, mother’s occupation, and geographic loca-
tion). The questions were randomized whenever possible 
to control for ordering effects.
Results
Hypothesis I Gender and religious affiliation (Mus-
lim, Jewish, or no religious affiliation) will affect Iranian-
Americans’ perceptions as to how willing Euro-Ameri-
cans are to welcome them. Specifically, Iranian-American 
Muslims will secure higher scores on the Social Distance 
Scale than will their non-Muslim peers (be they Jewish 
or those possessing no religious affiliation). Muslim men 
will score higher on the Social Distance Scale than will 
Muslim women.
Table  1 provides the descriptive statistics that allow us 
to explore the relationship between gender and religious 
affiliation and Iranian-Americans’ perceptions that Euro-
Americans desire to maintain a great deal (or little) Social 
Distance. To our surprise, both men and women, from a 
variety of religions, perceived that “typical” Americans 
were fairly accepting of them re: Social Distance (see 
Table 2).
We conducted a two-way ANOVA to explore whether 
or not there were significant effects of gender and/or reli-
gion on perceptions of social distance. Results indicate 
Table 1 Social distance scale
Bogardus (1959)
The higher the score, the less welcome people feel in the USA
1. Do you believe Euro-Americans would marry into the Iranian-American group Yes, no
2. Do you believe Euro-Americans would like Iranian-Americans as close friends Yes, no
3. Do you believe Euro-Americans would like Iranian-Americans as next door neighbors Yes, no
4. Do you believe Euro-Americans would like to work in the same office with Iranian-Americans Yes, no
5. Do you believe Euro-Americans would like Iranian-Americans as speaking acquaintances only Yes, no
6. Do you believe Euro-Americans would like Iranian-Americans as visitors only to the USA Yes, no
7. Do you believe Euro-Americans would like to debar Iranian Americans from the USA Yes, no
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that there were no statistically significant interactions 
between the effects of gender and religious affiliation on 
perceptions of social distance, F (2,332) = 1.27, p = 0.28. 
Figure  1 shows the mean perception of social distance 
score for each combination of gender group and religion 
affiliation group plotted in a line graph.
Main effects analysis make it clear that there was no 
significant effect for gender on perceptions of social dis-
tance, F (1, 332) =  1.15, p =  0.29. However, there were 
significant differences between the various religion affili-
ation groups on perceptions of Social Distance, F (2, 
332) = 3.50, p = 0.03, effect size η2 = 0.02. A Tukey post 
hoc test revealed that the Jewish group (M = 0.34) scored 
significantly higher than the no religion group (M = 0.20, 
p =  0.00) and the Muslim group (M =  0.23, p =  0.02). 
There was no significant difference between the no 
religion and the Muslim groups on perceptions of social 
distance, p = 0.57.
Although there was no significant interaction in the 
two-way ANOVA, different results were secured when 
the effects of religious affiliation on perceptions of social 
distance were analyzed for gender separately. For women, 
there were significant differences between the various 
religious affiliation groups on perceptions of social dis-
tance, F (2, 225) = 6.63, p = 0.00, effect size η2 = 0.004. 
A Tukey post hoc test revealed that the Jewish women 
group (M = 0.26) scored significantly higher than the no 
religion women group (M = 0.21, p = 0.00) and the Mus-
lim women group (M = 0.22, p = 0.01). There was no sig-
nificant difference between the no religion women group 
and the Muslim women group on perceptions of social 
distance, p  =  0.53. For men, no significant differences 
Table 2 Mean and standard deviation for gender and religion affiliation
Gender Religion affiliation
No religion Jewish Muslim Total
M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N
Men 0.21 0.30 52 0.26 0.26 24 0.22 0.30 34 0.22 0.29 110
Women 0.19 0.24 55 0.38 0.37 58 0.24 0.27 115 0.26 0.30 228
Total 0.20 0.27 107 0.34 0.34 82 0.23 0.28 149 0.25 0.30 338
Fig. 1 Mean social distance score by gender and religion affiliations
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between religion affiliation groups on perceptions of 
social distance were found, F (2, 107) = 0.22, p = 0.80.
Hypothesis II Iranian-American Muslims who pos-
sess a strong Iranian accent, darker skin color, or who 
appear prototypically Muslim, engage in displays of reli-
gious affiliation, or wear ethnically traditional clothing 
will secure higher scores on the Social Distance Scale 
than will Iranian-American Muslims whose appearance 
is more prototypically Euro-American. We will also con-
sider generational status, identification with an ethnicity 
in addition to Iranian-American, family income, and edu-
cation (as other possible markers of assimilation).
Question 1 Are Iranian-Americans’ perceptions of 
Euro-Americans’ social distance within the full sample 
predicted by Muslim identity, Jewish identity, gender, 
Iranian accent, skin color, displays of religious affiliation, 
displays of ethnically traditional clothing, generational 
status, identification with an ethnicity in addition to Ira-
nian-American, family income, and education?
First, a bivariate correlation was used to address rela-
tionships between our predictors and our outcome vari-
able, social distance. When the variables were continuous 
variables, a Pearson correlation was conducted; when the 
variables were categorical variables, the point-biserial 
correlation was conducted. Table  3 shows the correla-
tions we secured. The results make it clear that percep-
tions of social distance were significantly correlated with 
Iranian accent, displays of religious affiliation, genera-
tional status, and sub-ethnic identification.
Secondly, we conducted a multiple linear regression to 
test the predictive strength of the following predictors: 
skin tone (color), Iranian accent, displays of religious 
affiliation, ethnically traditional clothing, generational 
status, sub-ethnic identification (other than Iranian-
American), family income, and education on average 
reports of perceived social distance from Euro-American. 
Table 4 presents these results. The eight predictors com-
bined accounted for 13.8  % of social distance variance, 
F (8, 257) = 5.13, p = 0.00, and the effect size was 0.16. 
Iranian accent was significantly, and positively, associated 
with perception of social distance (t  =  2.31, p  =  0.02); 
displays of religious affiliation was significantly, and 
positively, associated with perception of social distance 
positively (t = 2.69, p = 0.01). Skin tone was negatively 
associated with social distance, although not significantly 
so, p = 0.07.
Question 2 Are Iranian-Americans’ perceptions of 
Euro-Americans’ social distance within each religious 
subsample (Iranian-Americans: Muslim, Jewish, no reli-
gious affiliation), predicted by gender, Iranian accent, 
skin color, displays of religious affiliation, displays of eth-
nically traditional clothing, generational status, identifi-
cation with an ethnicity in addition to Iranian-American, 
family income, and education?
A multiple linear regression was conducted for Jew-
ish (Table  5), Muslim (Table  6), and no religion group 
(Table  7) separately to compare religious affiliation dif-
ferences on predicting perceptions of social distance by 
the eight predictors. For Jewish group, Iranian accent 
and displays of religious affiliation predicted percep-
tions of social distance positively, t = 3.47, p = 0.00, and 
t =  2.94, p =  0.01, separately. For Muslim group, none 
of the predictors predicted perceptions of social distance 
significantly. For no religion group, skin tone predicted 
perceptions of social distance negatively, t  =  −2.50, 
p =  0.01. For the no religion group, generational status 




There were several surprises in our data. We discovered 
far more than we had bargained for. In Hypothesis I we 
Table 3 Correlations
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Skin tone 1
Iranian accent 0.01 1
Displays of religious affiliation −0.10 0.31** 1
Ethnically traditional clothing −0.05 −0.09 0.02 1
Generations status 0.02 0.44** 0.16** −0.06 1
Sub ethnic identification 0.13* −0.41** −0.33** 0.15** −0.12** 1
Family income −0.08 0.03 −0.02 −0.03 −0.13* −0.36** 1
Education 0.06 −0.10 −0.19** 0.08 0.14* 0.20** −0.14* 1
Social distance −0.09 0.27** 0.22** −0.08 0.18** −0.20** −0.10 −0.05
Page 9 of 13Paige et al. SpringerPlus  (2015) 4:747 
proposed that it would be the Iranian-American Muslims 
who would perceive the most prejudice—i.e., that Euro-
Americans were most eager to keep them at a distance.1 
1 We are using the term “prejudice” here to indicate the perception that 
Euro-Americans prefer to keep their distance from Iranian-Americans. 
The terms have a somewhat different meaning, of course. We are making 
the substitution because to use the long phrase (above) gets annoying. We 
assume readers will know what we mean.
This hypothesis was not supported. In Hypothesis II we 
further proposed that it would be the Iranian-American 
Muslims, who appeared prototypically Muslim (e.g., dis-
playing scarf/hijab, Allah necklace, a beard, Islamic stone, 
or a Tasbih), who would perceive that Euro-Americans 
wanted to keep them at a distance. Again we were wrong.
In contrast to Hypothesis I, it was Iranian-American 
Jews who perceived that Euro-Americans desired to 
Table 4 Prediction of social distance by predictors
a 0 = no, 1 = yes
b 0 = no, 1 = yes
c 0 = born in USA, 1 = born in somewhere else
d 0 = no, 1 = yes
Model B SE B β t p
Constant 0.33 0.14 – – –
Skin tone −0.04 0.02 −0.11 −1.81 0.07
Iranian accent 0.02 0.01 0.16 2.31 0.02
Displays of religious 0.12 0.04 0.17 2.69 0.01
Affiliationa
 Ethnically traditional −0.11 0.08 −0.09 −1.48 0.14
Clothingb
 Generational statusc 0.06 0.05 0.07 1.07 0.28
 Sub ethnic −0.04 0.04 −0.07 −0.92 0.36
Identificationd
 Family income −0.03 0.02 −0.10 −1.52 0.13
 Education 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.96 0.34
Total F = 5.13, p = 0.00




c 0 = born in USA, 1 = born in somewhere else
d 0 = no, 1 = yes
Model B SE B β t p
Constant 0.21 0.37 – – –
Skin tone −0.01 0.06 −0.01 −0.09 0.93
Iranian accent 0.07 0.02 0.44 3.47 0.00
Displays of religious 0.26 0.09 0.34 2.94 0.01
Affiliationa
 Ethnically traditional −0.09 0.21 −0.05 −0.46 0.65
Clothingb
 Generational statusc 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.16 0.87
 Sub ethnic −0.01 0.16 −0.01 −0.08 0.94
Identificationd
 Family income −0.05 0.05 −0.11 −0.92 0.36
 Education −0.01 0.04 −0.02 −0.16 0.87
Total F = 5.36, p = 0.00




c 0 = born in USA, 1 = born in somewhere else
d 0 = no, 1 = yes
Model B SE B β t p
Constant 0.43 0.27 – – –
Skin tone −0.03 0.03 −0.08 −0.74 0.46
Iranian accent 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.91
Displays of religious 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.82 0.41
Affiliationa
 Ethnically traditional −0.23 0.16 −0.15 −1.45 0.15
Clothingb
 Generational statusc 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.92
 Sub ethnic −0.05 0.07 −0.09 −0.76 0.45
Identificationd
 Family income −0.01 0.03 −0.03 −0.24 0.81
 Education −0.01 0.02 −0.06 −0.53 0.60
Total F = 1.08, p = 0.39




c 0 = born in USA, 1 = born in somewhere else
d 0 = no, 1 = yes
Model B SE B β t p
Constant 0.52 0.21 – – –
Skin tone −0.08 0.03 −0.27 −2.50 0.01
Iranian accent −0.01 0.02 −0.04 −0.37 0.72
Displays of religious 0.20 0.11 0.19 1.80 0.08
Affiliationa
 Ethnically traditional −0.07 0.09 −0.08 −0.80 0.43
Clothingb
 Generational statusc 0.14 0.08 0.21 1.87 0.07
 Sub ethnic −0.04 0.08 −0.05 −0.46 0.65
Identificationd
 Family income −0.02 0.03 −0.10 −0.91 0.37
 Education 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.15 0.88
Total F = 2.17, p = 0.04
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keep them at a distance. How can we account for this 
unexpected finding? We can think of several possible 
explanations.
Perhaps Iranian-American Muslims are more socially 
insulated than are Iranian-American Jews… and thus are 
unaware of the “typical” American’s prejudices. Theorists 
have argued that individuals who are members of histori-
cally stigmatized groups (like the Jews in America) are 
vigilant for signs of prejudice and often have a “trigger 
finger” when it comes to recognizing prejudice (Allport, 
1954).
Perhaps Jews feel particularly vulnerable in the current 
American climate—where Netanyahu and the State of 
Israel and many Republican conservatives are at logger-
heads with Obama and the Iran treaty.
Another explanation (for the fact that Jewish women 
are especially likely to perceive social distance between 
them and the Euro-American community) may have to do 
with Jewish women’s traditional roles as wives and moth-
ers. One of the many components of traditional “women’s 
work” has been to maintain the emotional and personal 
well being of one’s family (Hochschild and Machung 
2012). Perhaps (as a minority within a minority) Iranian-
American Jewish women feel it is their responsibility to 
transmit their Jewish culture inter-generationally as a 
way of maintaining the community’s health, well-being, 
and overall existence. Thus, they may feel compelled to 
marry and maintain strong relationships with other Ira-
nian-American Jews—resulting in a higher degree of per-
ceived social distance from Euro-Americans.
Another surprise: Americans’ preference for lighter 
skin tones and the advantages it confers on the posses-
sors have been widely documented in the past (Jones, 
2000). Interestingly, however, the analysis revealed that 
although skin color mattered for Iranian-American Jews 
and Muslims, the correlation between skin color and 
social distance was in the opposite direction from that we 
had proposed. Iranian-American Jews and Muslims with 
lighter skin tones perceived that Euro-Americans desired 
greater social distance than did their darker skinned 
peers. How can this be? There are several possibilities.
Perhaps Iranian-Americans with lighter skin tones are 
assumed to be Euro-American. Thus, Euro-Americans 
my freely express their prejudices toward Middle East-
erners in the presence of light skinned Iranian-Amer-
icans. Discovering how typical Americans really feel 
about Middle-Easterners may make Iranian-Americans 
aware of the gulf that exists between themselves and 
the typical American. A second possibility is that lighter 
skinned Iranian-American Muslims and/or Jews may feel 
rejected by both the mainstream Euro-Americans and 
by their own (darker skinned) peers. In-group members 
may assume that they do not experience much prejudice 
or discrimination and thus resent them for their alleged 
privilege.
Past researchers have demonstrated higher rates of 
prejudice and discrimination toward individuals with 
foreign accents (Lippi-Green 1994). Again, contrary to 
predictions, Iranian-American Jews perceived the great-
est social distance from Euro-Americans, based on acute-
ness of foreign accent—more so than Iranian-American 
Muslims or Iranian-Americans with no religious affilia-
tion. Again, this may be because Iranian-American Jews 
contend with layers of prejudice and discrimination 
based on their ethnicity, religion, and accent. Also, there 
are numerically fewer Iranian-American Jews in America 
and the world (than Iranian-American Muslims or those 
without religious affiliation). This may amplify Iranian-
American Jewish perceptions of social distance.
In the current study we created categories for Islamic 
and Jewish appearance. Iranian-American Jews were the 
only group that reported significantly higher rates of per-
ceived prejudice when displaying symbols of religious 
affiliation. In addition, both Iranian-American Jewish 
men and women with Jewish appearances (displaying the 
Star of David or a Yarmulke) reported significantly higher 
rates of perceived prejudice from Euro-Americans than 
Iranian-American Muslims and those with no religious 
affiliation.
Lastly, we found that Iranian-Americans who were 
born outside of the USA perceived higher rates of social 
distance than did those who were born in the USA One 
may suspect that Iranian-Americans born in the USA 
may be more assimilated into USA society than are their 
peers. It may be the case that cultural assimilation shields 
some Iranian-Americans from experiencing higher rates 
of perceived social distance from Euro-Americans.
Strengths and limitations
Dr. Paige speaks both English and Farsi with native flu-
ency. This aided with translation and avoiding cultural 
mistrust issues. It also helped us secure endorsements 
and collaborative efforts from Iranian-American 
organizations.
There are some limitations on our study, of course. 
Ideally, we would have interviewed a random sample 
of Iranian-Americans living in the United States. This 
was impossible for economic reasons, of course. While 
conducting the study in Southern California was the 
next best thing, since it afforded access to a large num-
ber of Iranian-Americans. Large populations of Ira-
nian-Americans reside in the areas of Orange County 
(the city of Irvine) and Los Angeles. In fact Los Ange-
les has the largest number of Iranians outside of Iran. 
The majority of Iranian-American Jews in the study 
were recruited from West Los Angeles. The majority of 
Page 11 of 13Paige et al. SpringerPlus  (2015) 4:747 
Iranian-American Muslims were recruited from Orange 
County. It is unclear if there are more or less Iranian-
American Muslims in Orange County verses Los Ange-
les, since the past researchers have only inquired about 
respondents’ ethnicity.
Recruiting from this region came with some draw-
backs, however. First off, both of these Southern Califor-
nia regions are affluent and median incomes far exceed 
national averages [OC, Mdn  =  75,762, Century City 
(West LA), Mdn = 95,135, National average = 42,979.61].
Iranian-Americans living in the Southern California 
region reside in a state that predominantly votes for the 
Democratic Party in elections. The LA Times described 
Southern California as a “melting pot”, with diverse com-
munities and neighborhoods that represent a number 
of racial ethnic groups. Despite the general political and 
cultural characteristics of California, Orange County is 
heavily populated with a majority of Republicans. Nev-
ertheless, the state is heavily populated with immigrants 
and is inclusive of cultures from many parts of the world. 
It is unclear how the political and economic makeup of 
this region affects the experiences of Iranian-Americans.
Another challenge was that although most Iranian-
Americans surveyed were born outside the USA, we 
failed to ask if they were refugees. The psyche, mentality, 
and culture of a refugee are significantly different from 
that of an immigrant.
Some of the unique challenges we faced in survey-
ing Iranian-Americans were cultural mistrust, refusal to 
denote religious affiliation, and the fact that most par-
ticipants were immigrants or refugees. While conducting 
the current study we found that many Iranian-Americans 
were extremely suspicious of how the information would 
be utilized. Many asked if there would be governmental 
tracking. Upon further conversation many participants 
voiced a concern. They described how in Iran, govern-
ment officials would ask about political attitudes in a 
seemingly safe environment, only to persecute individu-
als who had opinions against the regime. As a result, 
many participants worried that a similar strategy could 
be employed in the USA Thus, many individuals declined 
to take the survey and many others were very hesitant 
about answering questions about social distance from 
Euro-Americans. We assured participants, who did com-
plete the survey that it was confidential and that the only 
general demographic information that could be derived 
from our published papers.
Another interesting finding was that many Iranian-
Americans did not want to disclose their religious 
affiliation. Perhaps this refusal was due to fear of social 
marginalization or discrimination. This was evident 
by a few participants who reported not having any reli-
gious affiliation but “sometimes” (6 %) or “always” (2 %) 
displaying symbols of religious affiliation. Perhaps these 
individuals perceived religion as part of their ethnic iden-
tity and did not make a religious distinction within their 
personal identity. Hence some participants verbally iden-
tified as Iranian-American Jewish without being asked 
about religious affiliation. This area requires additional 
research.
Another challenge was that most Iranian-Americans 
surveyed were born outside the USA and we failed to 
ask if they were refugees. The psyche, mentality, and cul-
ture of refugees is significantly different from that of an 
immigrant.
Unfortunately, the UH IRB required us to reveal (on 
the consent form) our interest in studying the social atti-
tudes of Iranian-Americans, specifically their perceptions 
of the extent to which prejudice and/or discrimination 
against Iranian-Americans exists in the USA. Thus, by 
directly revealing what we aimed to measure, we may 
have attracted individuals who (1) perceived that “typi-
cal” Americans kept them at a distance, and/or (2) who 
were emotionally ready to talk about their perceptions. 
And, of course, since the 1960  s, social psychologists 
such as and Carl Hovland, Irving Janis, and Daniel Katz 
have documented that if people’s group membership is 
made salient (even implicitly), they are far more likely 
to express stereotyped attitudes than when simply asked 
about their own opinions (Fiske et al. 1987).
Participants were given a questionnaire written in 
English. If respondents were more comfortable speak-
ing Farsi, the first author translated the items for them. 
Naturally, researchers always worry that participants’ 
ethnicity and native language might affect their responses 
(Ervin-Tripp 2000; Nesbitt 2004). Whether or not groups 
differed in this way is, of course, a question for another 
study.
Researchers always face challenges in determining 
wither participants’ perceptions match observable facts.
Suggestions for subsequent research
It would be interesting to access the degree of partici-
pants’ assimilation into the USA culture and society. We 
need to determine whether those who fit in are more 
aware of others’ prejudices or feel less prejudice directed 
toward themselves.
We should also “unpack” what is included in the sim-
ple religious labels “Muslim”, “Jewish”, or “No religion.” 
Obviously, people in those categories may differ in a wide 
variety of other ways. When did the families come to 
America? How insular are the various groups at the pre-
sent time (for example, do the “insular” Muslim groups 
have greater intermarriage rates or live in enclaves?) How 
affluent are the different groups? What is their social 
class? What is their political affiliation? How sympathetic 
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or opposed are they to the current Iranian political 
groups? Do they support the current Peace treaty? Which 
religious affiliations are seen as most “American?” From 
the data, we might expect Americans, with Judeo Chris-
tian roots, see the “no religion” participants as most 
similar to themselves—since this group reports less 
awareness of prejudice (social distance).
It would be interesting for future researchers to explore 
what (if any) social, political, or economic benefits or 
privileges Iranian-Americans gain through assimilation, 
taking into account religious affiliation.
Must Iranian-American Muslims and Jews change their 
religious affiliation in order to assimilate? These are all 
questions we hope to explore in future studies.
Concluding comments
The current study demonstrated the complex social iden-
tities of Iranian-Americans. As is evident by the results 
enumerated above, Iranian-American perceptions (and 
perhaps actual experiences) are significantly influenced 
by religious affiliation. We hope that researchers will 
begin to examine Iranian-American identity in a more 
multi-dimensional manner that takes into account the 
intersectionality of ethnicity and religion. The study also 
demonstrated that Iranian-American Jews and Muslims 
are vulnerable and perceive higher rates of social distance 
from Euro-Americans. Thus, this is an issue that should 
be taken into account when developing policy and stand-
ards of practice both in public and private organizations.
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